An guest analysis by Rainer Rupp
Palantir
and Brave1 and Dataroom are regarded as symbols of a new form of
AI-supported warfare, exemplified by their use in Ukraine. Yet a sober
assessment shows that while the technology can accelerate processes and
improve systems, it is not a wonder weapon capable of deciding the war
in favour of Ukraine.
Few
aspects of modern warfare are currently associated as closely with the
promise of technological superiority as the use of artificial
intelligence, data analysis and autonomous drone systems. Palantir and
the Ukrainian platform Brave1 and Dataroom are at the centre of this
development, including German-Ukrainian cooperation in the defence
sector. Some of the West’s uncritical, technology-fixated reporting
creates the impression that modern software could fundamentally
transform the nature of war and give Ukraine a decisive military
advantage over Russia.
A
sober assessment of the available information, however, presents a far
more nuanced picture. Palantir and Systems like Dataroom can make
existing Ukrainian systems react faster, more precise and more
efficient. But they are neither a ‘Terminator system’ nor a substitute
for hard weapons, soldiers or defence-industrial production capacity.
Their principal value lies in adding a digital force-multiplier to
military capabilities that already exist.
Amid
all the AI hype, the most important component is often overlooked,
whether deliberately or through ignorance. Without this component,
Palantir and Dataroom would lose much of their force-multiplying effect
in Ukraine and elsewhere. Without the intelligence gathered by US
satellites and other sophisticated military signals-intelligence
systems—and fed into Palantir and Dataroom in real time by US
intelligence agencies—the current fascination with this supposed new
wonder weapon would probably not exist.
All
these systems are prohibitively expensive, and neither Ukraine nor Iran
possesses the money or technological capacity to create an environment
of this kind, which took the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia
decades to build.
But
let’s return to Brave-1 Dataroom, which is regarded as a secure
platform built on Palantir software. According to the available
information, more than one hundred Ukrainian companies use real combat
data, particularly of visual and thermal imagery of aerial targets such
as Shahed or Geran drones. The aim is to train AI models under
real-world weather conditions to integrate and streamline sensors of
air-defence systems. Ultimately, this is intended to enable targets to
be detected and classified more quickly and, in some cases, be tracked
autonomously.
Palantir,
Dataroom and the War in UkraineBut the AI-Support does not eliminate
the Russian drone problem for Ukraine. Russia can increase the number of
drones it launches, alter their flight profiles, deploy decoys or
intensify electronic countermeasures, or make them faster and fly higher
and change their attack modus to a vertical dive on the target.
This
is precisely where a central limitation of the digital approach becomes
apparent. The war is evolving into a race of technical adaption. With
assistance from Western intelligence services and their reconnaissance
data, Ukraine was able to improve its detection, data fusion and
autonomous interception systems; Russia is responding with electronic
warfare, with deception, with greater numbers and recently with
onboard-AI of its own.
According
to the available sources, some Russian drones are being equipped with
machine-vision systems and more autonomous navigation. Under certain
conditions, this allows their drones to continue operating even when
their link to a human operator—the drone pilot—is disrupted.
The
Russian view of Palantir also differs from the Western one. Russian
media frequently describe the software as part of a Western
command-and-reconnaissance network and emphasing its potential role in
target selection and strikes deep inside Russian territory. Sources in
specialist military and technical publications describe essentially the
same core functions: integrating data, identifying targets more quickly
and accelerating military decision-making.
Here
lies the crucial distinction from Western assessments: AI is a force
multiplier and not a winner of the war. Software can increase the
effectiveness of existing weapons. It can make drones more intelligent,
speed up reconnaissance and shorten response times. What it cannot do is
produce additional artillery, air-defence systems, ammunition or, above
all, soldiers, of which Ukraine is running out.
This
limitation becomes particularly clear in the struggle for territory. AI
can identify targets, control drones, or support logistics and
reconnaissance. But it cannot occupy a city permanently, clear trenches
or secure a building. Those tasks still require people.
Despite
increasing automation, Russia likewise continues to rely on infantry,
artillery and glide bombs. The available Russian sources therefore reach
the same conclusion: AI and drones can perform certain tasks and reduce
losses, but they cannot replace a human presence on the ground.
This
also puts into perspective the notion that Palantir or Dataroom could
fundamentally alter the outcome of the war in favour of Ukraine. Their
impact is real, but they operate within a much larger military system.
The decisive factors remain troop strength, mobilisation, ammunition
production, air defence, artillery, logistics, electronic warfare and
the ability to hold territory once it has been captured.
Greater
digitalisation can therefore change the way the war is fought without
however determining its outcome. It can improve efficiency and help
Ukraine, in particular, partly offset its limited manpower with
technological assistance from the West. At the same time, the same
technological advances allow Russia to adapt its own systems and
maintain pressure on Ukraine’s defences.
The
Western hype surrounding Palantir and Dataroom should therefore be
treated with caution. These are important technological tools, not
wonder weapons. They can accelerate decisions and improve the
survivability of individual systems, but they do not resolve Ukraine’s
fundamental military and political problems.
The
most realistic conclusion is therefore this: Palantir and Brave1
Dataroom can influence the character of individual engagements, but they
do not automatically alter the balance of power across the war as a
whole.
Technology
can accelerate adaptation, but it cannot override the material, human
and political foundations of war. Unless accompanied by solutions to the
underlying strategic problems, it may even be less likely to produce a
decisive outcome but prolong the ability of both sides’ to continue the
existing war of attrition much longer.
That
does not make Palantir and Dataroom militarily insignificant. It simply
means assessing their role realistically: they accelerate and amplify
the effects of certain weapons systems, particularly in air warfare, but
they are not a technology capable of averting Ukraine’s inevitable
defeat.
/ @theduran
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